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• The decision on EMU strongly affects the course of monetary and fiscal policies in 1997 and especially in
1998. We assume that the monetary union will start in January 1, 1999 with a sizable number of participat-
ing countries. Once the decision on the members is made in the spring of 1998, any differences between
short-term interest rates in the participating countries can be eliminated. Currently, money market rates in
Italy, in Spain and in Portugal are substantially higher than, for example, in Germany. These high rates will
be reduced quickly. Monetary policy will thus become more expansionary not only in these countries but
also in Western Europe as a whole. It is not likely that the central banks in countries with relatively low in-
terest rates will tighten their policy because such moves would be resisted in the light of the severe unem-
ployment in Europe.
• While fiscal policy is concerned with reducing budget deficits this year in order to qualify for EMU, the
course will change in 1998. Governments can afford to loosen this policy stance because the actual deficits
in 1998 are not decisive for the entry into the monetary union. Also, the stability pact will become effective
only from 1999 onwards, so there will not be any sanctions even if budget deficits are excessive in 1998.
Therefore, further substantial cuts in expenditures or increases in revenues are not likely. In a few coun-
tries, even tax cuts were announced for 1998, for example, in France and in Germany. In summary, fiscal
policy will have an expansionary effect on economic activity in 1998.
• The upswing in Western Europe will continue in 1997 and in 1998. Export conditions are favorable since
the world economy will expand at a healthy pace. The increase in internal demand will accelerate because
of the impulses from economic policy. In practically all countries, capacity utilization will reach or even sur-
pass its normal level in the course of next year. As central banks will be expansionary in the fourth conse-
cutive year, the phase of disinflation in Europe is coming to an end. Inflation will go up somewhat in 1998
and more so in the following year. Because of the deteriorating outlook for inflation, European currencies
will further devalue against the US dollar and long-term interest rates will increase considerably. All these
developments are a burden for the start of EMU. The future European Central Bank will have to follow a
restrictive course if it wants to demonstrate its commitment to price level stability.
. • The Dublin resolution for a "stability pact" is intended to limit budget deficits after EMU will have started.
However, the agreement is not sufficient to reach this target for several reasons: First, the governments
themselves will decide on sanctions; this raises the possibility that political factors play a major role and
that opportunistic behavior will dominate. Second, the sanction mechanism has no bite because too much
time goes by until sanctions are implemented. Furthermore, in order to avoid the payment of a fine it is suf-
ficient to reduce the budget deficit to a level of 3 percent of GDP once in five years.
• A strict sanction mechanism is probably objected by several governments because they fear that it would
prevent the automatic stabilizers from working appropriately, so that, e.g., fiscal policy would have to be
restrictive in a recession. However, this fear is not warranted because the cyclical budget deficits in all EU
countries have not been veiy large during the last fifteen years. In order to avoid excessive deficits in the
future, it would be necessary to reduce the structural deficits considerably, in some cases even to zero.
This is an ambitious target, but it is precisely what was decided upon in Dublin. So far, however, this is
merely a promise because in practically no major country efforts are made to balance the budget by 1999
— a fact which reduces the credibility of the Dublin resolution even more.
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ISSN 0455 - 04201. Economic Situation Improved in 1996
Since the spring of 1996, the European econ-
omies have expanded at a healthy pace. After
having overcome the previous weakness, which
had lasted almost a year, real GDP increased at
an annual rate of more than 2 percent. For the
year as a whole, the increase amounted to only
1.6 percent due to the weak start. The recovery
was supported by the rapid growth in less de-
veloped and in newly industrialized countries.
Also, the demand from North America picked
up markedly in the wake of a renewed strength
of the upturn mainly in the United States; fur-
thermore, the devaluation of the European cur-
rencies vis-a-vis the US dollar raised the com-
petitiveness of exporters on world markets.
Domestic demand in Europe was stimulated by
an expansionary monetary policy. Key interest
rates were reduced further and have reached a
very low level; money growth also accelerated
in most countries. Another factor which led to
an improvement of the business climate was
that the decline of long-term interest rates con-
tinued after a temporary increase until the early
summer of 1996.
Inflation remained moderate. On average for
Western Europe, consumer prices increased by
a little more than 2 percent over the past 12
months. In a few countries, the stability of the
price level was practically achieved. In contrast
to this favorable development, the situation on
labor markets hardly improved at all; the rate of
unemployment for Western Europe stagnated at
11 percent. Some countries even experienced
record highs for the level of unemployment.
There are, however, exceptions from this un-
favorable trend. Unemployment rates continued
to decline in countries where labor markets
have been deregulated, in some cases, however,
this was mainly due to active labor market
policies.
The development of economic activity and
inflation in the near future will largely be in-
fluenced by the expectations as well as the out-
come of the discussions concerning the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU). No decisions
have been made with regard to the starting date,
the countries participating from the beginning,
or the method of defining the conversion rates
for the currencies. Therefore, assumptions have
to be made for the forecast which will be ex-
plained in the following two sections on monet-
ary and on fiscal policy. Because of the un-
certainties in connection with EMU, the fore-
cast of the economic development in Western
Europe currently bears a greater risk than usual.
2. On the Road to EMU: Monetary Policy Will Become
More Expansionary
In most European countries, central banks have
loosened their policy since 1995. Short-term
interest rates have declined considerably, and
money growth has accelerated as well. This ex-
pansionary course led to the turnaround of
economic activity in Europe which materialized
during the first half of 1996. During 1997 and
1998, the upcoming decision on EMU will have
a strong impact on monetary policy. Obviously,
the governments of EU member states intend to
stick to January 1, 1999 as the starting date. We
therefore do not assume a postponement of
EMU. The decision on the participating coun-
tries and the conversion rates for the exchange
rates will change the conditions for the course
of monetary policy for individual countries but
also for Europe as a whole.
It is possible that there will be a small mon-
etary union with countries of the so-called DM
bloc, i.e. Germany, France, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg. Such a de-
cision could have negative consequences for
those countries that are currently hoping they
will participate as well. For example, Italy,Spain and Portugal might then experience a
negative rating on financial markets because
doubts could arise concerning their stabilization
policies. Their currencies, which have gained
strength recently would come under pressure,
and long-term interest rates, which have fallen
considerably since the spring of 1995, would
increase markedly. The central banks in these
countries would probably raise key interest
rates in order to prevent such developments and
to gain credibility on international markets for
their stabilization efforts. They would have to
try to prevent a depreciation of their currencies
and try to keep the exchange rate stable because
this is a necessary condition for entering the
monetary union in the not too distant future.
Such restrictions of monetary policy would
dampen economic activity in these countries
considerably and would also — via a reduced
demand for imports — have a negative impact
on the other European countries.
For the present, however, we assume that
EMU will start with a large number of coun-
tries. While the participation of Denmark,
Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom may
be unlikely for various reasons, the other coun-
tries will most likely participate from the begin-
ning if they wish so.
1 We believe that the de-
cision which is due in the spring of 1998 will
be made also in favor of those countries which
will not have reached all the reference values of
the Maastricht criteria. These criteria will prob-
ably not be strictly applied — contrary to the
often-heard promise by governments and cen-
tral banks. If they were, a large number of
countries could already be excluded now be-
cause they will definitely miss at least one of
the criteria. For example, it is currently clear
that five countries do not meet the requirement
of exchange rate stability because they are not
participating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) of the European Monetary. System
(EMS) or have joined it too late. The
Maastricht Treaty is — contrary to the defi-
nition of other criteria — very precise in this
respect; Italy and Finland only joined the ERM
in the fall of 1996 and not, as required, two
years before the decision on EMU is made, i.e.
two years before the spring of 1998. As they
have not been excluded so far, it is likely that
the governments leave this issue open for a
mainly political decision later on. Apart from
this, the development on financial markets in-
dicates that market participants believe in a soft
interpretation of the criteria. The differential
between long-term interest rates in the individ-
ual countries and in Germany has come down
considerably (Lapp et al. 1996); the conver-
gence has been greater than the decline of in-
flation differentials.
The decision in the spring of 1998 will be
the beginning of a unified monetary policy in
the European Union. With the start of EMU,
there will, by definition, be no differences in
money market rates between the participating
economies. Existing differentials can, however,
already be eliminated once the group of coun-
tries is determined. This has substantial conse-
quences for monetary policy in several coun-
tries (see the extensive analysis by Scheide and
Solveen 1997). Currently, short-term interest
rates in Italy are about four percentage points
higher than in Germany; for Spain and
Portugal, the differential amounts to some three
percentage points (Table 1). Countries with
relatively high rates probably have a great inter-
est to reduce these rates immediately: First of
all, they have an incentive to do so because
they can expect that the positive impact on pro-
duction and employment will come about
quickly — and will thus be favorable for the
situation in their countries —, while the infla-
tionary effect usually takes longer to material-
ize and will have to be borne mainly by all the
EMU countries in 1999 or thereafter. In other
words: The short-term trade-off between un-
employment and inflation improves. Secondly,
there is no risk that such a loosening of monet-
ary policy will put the exchange rate under
pressure. Given that the decision on conversion
rates will have been made in the spring of 1998
as well, there is no profit opportunity for specu-
lators if the announcement about the method of
conversion is credible.
2 With the substantial
reduction of short-term interest rates in a fairly
large number of countries, monetary policy will
be more expansionary not only there but also in
the European Union as a whole.Table 1 — Three-Month Money Market Rates in the EU

































We do not expect that the central banks in
countries with already low short-term interest
rates will substantially tighten monetary policy
at the same time. A slight increase of key inter-
est rates is likely in the course of 1998; how-
ever, this would only imply that the rate of
monetary expansion does not accelerate con-
siderably. To sum up: The interest rate moves
in our forecast imply that monetary policy in
the European Union will become more expan-
sionary.
3
This means that in 1998 the central banks'
policy will be stimulative for the fourth year in
a row. The additional loosening will give an-
other boost to the recovery. But it also implies a
risk for price level stability: There will be a
slight acceleration of inflation in 1998 and a
more pronounced increase in 1999. This would
raise the skepticism not only in the public but
also on financial markets concerning the stabil-
ity of the future European currency. We there-
fore expect an increase of long-term interest
rates which reflect inflationary expectations
and a further depreciation of the European cur-
rencies, in particular against the US dollar. All
these developments place a burden on the start
of EMU. The European Central Bank will have
to pursue a restrictive course right from the
beginning if it wants to demonstrate its commit-
ment to price level stability. There is a substan-
tial risk, therefore, that EMU will be viewed as
a new regime in which interest rates are raised
and the economy slows down.
3. Fiscal Policy Will Loosen Somewhat in 1998
In 1997, governments intend to meet the refer-
ence values stated in the Maastricht Treaty.
In practically each country of the European
Union, measures are taken to reduce the budget
deficits. In most cases, indirect taxes are raised;
the same is true for social security contributions
in order to limit the high deficits of those
budgets. On the expenditure side, increases in
social expenditures are cut and public invest-
ment projects are postponed. In 1997, fiscal
policy will therefore dampen economic activity.
It has to be kept in mind, however, that the re-
duction of the structural deficits overstates the
restrictive course somewhat because it is in part
also due to special circumstances which do not
affect the business cycle. Among these is the
decline of interest rates which lowers the bur-
den of servicing the debt.
In the coming year, fiscal policy will be
loosened somewhat. The decision on EMU will
be made on the basis of the actual data for the
year 1997, so the figures for 1998 will be less
important. Furthermore, the stability pact will
be applied only from 1999 onwards, which
means that there will not be any sanctions if
budget deficits exceed the reference value in
1998. Some relief can also be expected from
stronger economic activity, i.e. the cyclical
component of the deficit will decline. There-
fore, further substantial cuts in expenditures or
increases in revenues are not likely. In some
cases even tax cuts were announced for 1998,for example, in France and in Germany. Invest-
ment projects which were postponed in order to
reduce the deficits will now be realized. In
summary, therefore, fiscal policy will have an
— albeit small — expansionary effect on eco-
nomic activity next year.
4. Upturn Gains Momentum
For the countries of the European Union, ex-
ports were the main driving force of the recov-
ery last year (Figure 1). But also domestic de-
mand picked up considerably compared to the
pace in 1995. The reduction of inventories
came to a halt; in the latter part of 1996, there
was even a positive impact of stockbuilding on
overall production. But also fixed investment
showed some revival; the surge during the
second quarter was, however, to a large extent a
reaction to the depressed first quarter when
construction was hit hard by the strong winter.
Private consumption stayed on a very moderate
path. In some countries, tax reductions or spe-
cial subsidies stimulated expenditures of pri-
vate households somewhat. Throughout the
year, however, the restrictive measures of fiscal
policy together with the bad situation on labor
markets dampened consumption considerably.
In general, the performance of business in-
vestment has not been bad in the current cycle.
Compared with the recovery in the early 1980s,
the development of investment in machinery
and equipment has even been more favorable in
a number of countries (Figure 2).
4 In some
cases, the current level of this aggregate is
about 20 to 25 percent higher than in the be-
ginning of the recovery in 1992 or in 1993.
What seems remarkable, however, is the weak-
ness in Germany; currently, the level of in-
vestment in machinery and equipment reaches
roughly the level prevailing at the beginning of
1993. While this shows some parallels with the
situation in Japan — and may thus reflect a
structural weakness of the economy —, it must
be kept in mind that there was an investment
boom in the wake of German unification. In the
early 1990s, investment became extremely
profitable due to heavy subsidization by the
government; the investment ratio reached a
very high level and has more or less normalized
since then (Boss et al. 1997).
The recovery in Europe will continue in
1997 and in 1998 (Table 2). The conditions set
by economic policy are favorable: Impulses
from monetary policy will remain strong
throughout the forecast horizon. Fiscal policy is
going to shift to a slightly expansionary course
next year. The currencies will probably devalue
further. Wage settlements will be particularly
moderate in 1997 because of the poor labor
market situation; while wages may increase a
little faster next year, they will still lag behind
productivity growth. This will allow for a fur-
ther improvement of firms' profits and thus
have a stimulative impact on investment.
During the first half of 1997, the expansion
of real GDP will accelerate substantially be-
cause firms will increase their stocks in antici-
pation of a stronger growth of demand. While
some moderation can be expected afterwards,
the rate of increase will continue to be higher
than the growth rate of potential output, which
is roughly 2 percent for Western Europe as a
whole. On average, real GDP will rise by
2.5 percent in 1997 and by about 3 percent in
1998.
The driving force of the upswing will be pri-
vate investment. The increase in capacity utili-
zation will imply more capital widening. Fur-
thermore, construction will benefit from the
realization of public investment projects which
were previously postponed.
Private consumption will expand only slowly
in the near future. Employment will recover
only later in 1997. This implies —together
with the restrictive stance of fiscal policy and
moderate wage increases — that real disposable
income will rise only slowly. In the course of
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ly to increase expenditures a little faster. On the
one hand, there will be no fiscal restraint, and
on the other hand, the employment situation
will improve due to the strong upswing of
economic activity.
Apart from the favorable conditions for do-
mestic demand, exports will expand strongly.
The growth of the world economy continues to
be high, and Western Europe will — more than
other regions — benefit from the improvement
in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, we
expect the devaluation of European currencies
against the US dollar to continue, thus strength-
ening the competitive position in world mar-
kets. Furthermore, we do not see a risk of over-
heating in the United States. It is true that real
wages have increased there somewhat recently
but still at a lower rate than productivity. This
does not suggest that cost pressure is mounting
which would lead to more inflation. Most
monetary indicators suggest that the Fed has
been on a more or less neutral course for the
past two years: Real short-term interest rates
are about as high as the historical average, so is
the differential between long-term and short-
term interest rates; finally, monetary aggregates
have been expanding at moderate rates. There-
fore, there is also no risk that the Fed will
tighten its policy substantially; any interest rate
hike would be just symbolic to demonstrate its
anti-inflationary commitment. The recovery in
Japan is also likely to continue in spite of the
fiscal tightening. Experience of other countries
such as Canada shows that its negative impact
on economic activity can be compensated by
an expansionary monetary policy. This is the
stance we expect from the Bank of Japan. To
sum up: Our forecast implies a fairly syn-
chronized upswing with similar rates of GDP
growth for the three major regions of in-
dustrialized countries.
Unemployment in Europe will start to fall
only during the second half of this year. In the
near future, there are still productivity reserves
which can be exploited without raising em-
ployment. In 1998, the unemployment rate will
decline to an average of about 10 percent
(Table 3).10






































































a percentage of the
The outlook for inflation, however, is dete-
riorating. The phase of disinflation, which has
lasted about six years, is coming to an end.
While the expected loosening of monetary pol-
icy will not lead to a dramatic increase, in-
flation rates are likely to go up somewhat in the
course of 1998 and more so in the following
year. A negative impact will also arise from
raw material prices, which are expected to in-
crease more strongly.
5. Upswing in Germany Continues
In the course of 1996, economic activity in
Germany increased considerably.
5 The driving
factor was the performance of exports because
demand had picked up strongly in trading
partner countries and German firms had gained
competitiveness due to the depreciation of the
D-mark. In contrast, domestic demand rose
only sluggishly. Private consumption was
negatively affected by the rise in unemploy-
ment. While investment in machinery and
equipment showed some signs of revival, the
construction boom came to an end: For the first
time since 1985, it declined after previous
year's level. During the winter months, the
employment situation continued to worsen. The
unemployment rate reached a.new record high
of 11.3 percent at the beginning of 1997. The
inflation rate picked up recently due to a con-
siderable rise in import prices; the year-over-
year increase of the CPI amounted to 1.7 per-
cent in February.
Recent indicators suggest that the pause in
the recovery near the end of 1996 will be only
short-lived. The pickup of the business climate
and the new order inflow point at an accel-
eration of the expansion in the near future. In
fact, the underlying conditions for the business
cycle are extremely favorable: Interest rates are
very low, and foreign demand will mostjikely
remain strong.
The Deutsche Bundesbank has left key inter-
est rates unchanged for the past six months. We
do not expect an increase in the course of this
year: Inflation continues to be below 2 percent,
and capacity utilization will reach its normal
level only later this year; also, the appreciation
of the US dollar is viewed mainly as a correc-
tion of the previous overshooting of the D-
mark. In 1998, however, the situation will
change somewhat. Output will be higher than
normal, and inflation will be picking up
slightly. Experience shows that the Bundesbank
raised interest rates considerably in periods
with a comparable development. However, we
expect that the Bundesbank will raise key inter-
est rates only slightly because of the special11
institutional situation in Europe before EMU
starts.
Another positive factor for the upswing is
that wage moderation will continue. Unit labor
costs will remain roughly constant in 1997 and
will even decline slightly next year.
Fiscal policy will have a moderately restric-
tive effect on economic activity in 1997 due to
the significant rise of social security contribu-
tions. This course will change next year when
parts of the currently discussed tax reform —
originally planned to be effective in 1999 —
will be implemented. Income taxes will proba-
bly be reduced while indirect taxes may be
raised. We expect the net effect to amount to a
tax relief of about DM 13 billion, equivalent to
almost 0.4 percent of nominal GDP.
Real GDP will pick up again this year. The
annual rate of expansion will average some
3 percent until the end of 1998. While exports
will remain strong, domestic expenditures Will
gain considerable momentum. In particular, the
outlook for investment in machinery and
equipment will improve significantly due to the
strong increase in profits. Unemployment will
start to decline in the second half of 1997.
6. Catching-up Process in Eastern Germany Stalls
In eastern Germany, the catching-up process
has practically stopped. In 1996, real GDP in-
creased only slightly faster than in the west
(2.0 percent compared to 1.3 percent). A major
factor was the end of the construction boom
which had boosted production in previous
years. Enormous efforts were made to rebuild
or modernize the capital stock in the new
Lander, so that residential and non-residential
investment per capita was about 80 percent
higher than in the old Lander. As the level of
transfers from the west is no longer increasing,
such a dynamic development cannot be sus-
tained. Nevertheless, investment will continue
to be higher because the infrastructure still
needs improvements and the number of apart-
ments is still quite low compared to western
standards.
There is still no upswing driven by endoge-
nous forces. The weak spot is the lack of com-
petitiveness in the manufacturing but also in the
services sector. A major reason for this is that
unit labor costs are still more than 30 percent
higher than in western Germany (Table 4). This
gap is likely to even widen in 1997. All in all,
real GDP will increase at a lower rate than in
the old federal states in both 1997 and 1998.
Table 4 — Indicators of the Catching-up Process in Eastern Germany, 1991-1998 (western Germany = 100)
GDPb




























































7. Expansion in France Accelerates
The recovery in France gained momentum in
the second half of 1996. Due to the improved
situation in main trading partner countries but
also to the devaluation against the US dollar,
exports rose faster than during the first half of
the year. Investment activity also picked up af-
ter having practically stagnated since the be-
ginning of 1995. For construction a stabi-
lization could be observed after the previous
decline. This was mainly due to the low level of
interest rates and the improved sales expec-
tations of firms. During the second half of
1996, private consumption was quite erratic.
Obviously, the subsidization of purchases of
new cars, which ended in September, led to the
concentration of car sales during the third
quarter; in the fourth quarter, the expected
backlash could be observed. For the year as a
whole, private consumption increased by about
2.5 percent.
Inflation remained at a low level. In February
1997, the year-over-year increase of consumer
prices amounted to around 1.5 percent. The la-
bor market situation deteriorated further in
spite of the recovery. Especially in the con-
struction sector, employment was reduced
markedly. The rate of unemployment in the
French economy increased to 12.7 percent at
the beginning of this year.
The Banque de France has continued to pur-
sue an expansionary course. Until recently,
short-term interest rates have been reduced in
small steps, and the rate of monetary expansion
(Ml) has accelerated. For the rest of 1997 and
for next year, we do not expect a major change
in the policy stance of the central bank. Further
reductions in short-term interest rates are not
likely as they reached the level prevailing in
Germany. In the course of 1998, key rates will
probably be raised moderately more or less in
line with the respective moves by the Deutsche
Bundesbank. This, however, does not imply a
change in the policy stance.
Fiscal policy has continued to bring the
budget deficit in order to meet the Maastricht
criteria. For 1997, expenditures are fixed at the
level in the previous year; in real terms, this is
equivalent to a reduction of about 1.5 percent.
On the revenue side, marginal income tax rates
were reduced; however, the effect was more or
less compensated by a broadening of the tax
base for the income tax and for social security
contributions on the one hand and an increase
of various sales taxes on the other. In the cur-
rent year, the overall impact of fiscal policy
will be restrictive. This will change, however,
in 1998 when — as it was announced — taxes
will be reduced. Therefore, fiscal policy will be
moderately expansionary next year.
The recovery will gain more momentum in
the course of 1997. Investment will increase
markedly, especially in machinery and equip-
ment, due to the low level of interest rates, the
increase in capacity utilization and favorable
profit expectations. Also, overall production
will be pushed by higher stockbuilding; last
year, inventories were reduced by the firms.
While private consumption will rise only mod-
erately in 1997, a stronger increase can be ex-
pected for next year due to the improvement of
the employment situation and the positive ef-
fects from fiscal policy. Exports will be stimu-
lated by the rapid expansion of economic ac-
tivity abroad and the improved price competi-
tiveness of French firms on world markets.
Real GDP will increase by a little more than 2.5
percent in 1997 and by almost 3 percent next
year.
Inflation will remain moderate in the near
future. In the course of 1998, however, it will
accelerate due to the strong recovery of the
French economy; on average, however, the in-
crease of the CPI will only be slightly higher
than this year.13
8. Strong Domestic Demand in the United Kingdom
The expansion of economic activity in the
United Kingdom accelerated considerably in
the second half of 1996. Private consumption
was particularly strong for several reasons:
Real disposable income increased substantially
due to the good performance of employment;
taxes and contributions were not raised as in
previous years; and finally, mortgage rates
continued to decline so that the debt burden of
private households who have mortgages with
variable interest rates eased further.
Investment activity also picked up strongly.
This was true throughout the year for machin-
ery and equipment. The main positive factors
were the improved profit expectations and the
low level of interest rates. The latter also con-
tributed to the increase in construction, which
could be observed during the second half of
1996. Also, the increase of the prices for real
estate was a positive factor. Exports continued
to rise at a fairly rapid pace; the expansion of
the deliveries to countries in Western Europe
even accelerated considerably.
The employment situation continued to im-
prove. Early this year, the unemployment rate
dropped to less than 6.5 percent while it
amounted to 8 percent one year ago. Inflation
has accelerated somewhat since the fall of
1996. In January, the year-over-year increase
was 2.8 percent; if mortgage rates are excluded,
the rate was even 3.1 percent, which is above
the target of 2.5 percent set by the Bank of
England.
In the light of this development, the central
bank continued to push for higher key interest
rates. According to the Inflation Report (Bank
of England 1997), neither the rise of the short-
term interest rate in 1996 nor the revaluation of
the British pound is sufficient to keep infla-
tionary dangers in check. In fact, money growth
continues to be strong indicating substantial
impulses for economic activity. We do not ex-
pect an interest rate hike before the coming
elections, which will be held on the 1st of May
this year. Afterwards, the key interest rate will
most likely be raised by more than one per-
centage point so that the stimulative effect of
monetary policy will gradually decline over the
forecast period.
Fiscal policy will most likely be more or less
neutral in both 1997 and 1998. For the fiscal
year 1997/98, there are plans for minor shifts
from direct to indirect taxes. We do not expect
major changes in fiscal policy irrespective of
which party will win the election.
The upswing will continue this year and
next. However, it will lose some momentum
due to the expected slowdown of export
growth. The strong appreciation of the pound
since last fall — amounting to about 15 percent
in real effective terms — implies a substantial
deterioration of the competitive position of
British exporters on world markets. So exports
will increase only moderately in spite of the
strong recovery in trading partner countries.
We expect that the appreciation of the currency
will continue with the discussion and the de-
cision on EMU, although it will slow down
considerably. Since the adjustment to exchange
rate changes takes about one year (Lapp et al.
1995), exports will expand still a little faster in
1998 than in 1997, although they will increase
by less than world trade.
Domestic expenditures will continue to ex-
pand at a healthy pace, and this applies to all
components of demand. In 1997, the increase of
real GDP will be a little higher than 2.5 percent
to be followed by almost 3 percent in 1998.
Given the excellent performance of the econ-
omy, unemployment will decline further. How-
ever, there is a risk that inflation will accelerate
since the prolonged expansionary course of
monetary policy will allow firms to raise their
prices considerably; the strong pound will,
however, dampen the increase somewhat. We
expect that the retail price index will increase
by a little more than 3 percent this year and by
3.5 percent in 1998.14
9. Gradual Improvement of the Italian Economy
The Italian economy expanded only very slow-
ly last year, due to the continuing restrictive
course of monetary and fiscal policy. Only at
the end of 1996, a slight recovery could be
observed. Exports picked up after the dampen-
ing effect of the revaluation of the Italian lira
— it amounted to about 20 percent in real ef-
fective terms between the spring of 1995 and
the spring of 1996 — has begun to fade. Private
consumption stagnated throughout the year as
real disposable incomes were almost flat due to
a weak performance of employment and the in-
creases of taxes and social contributions. The
firms invested less during the last year, the
main reasons being the low capacity utilization
and the fact that reinvested profits were not
supported any more by tax law after last spring.
The unemployment rate remained at a high
level of about 12 percent. Inflation came down
further; in February, the year-over-year in-
crease was just 2.3 percent after a level of
4 percent in mid-1996. Apparently, the persis-
tent monetary restrictions showed an effect, and
the appreciation of the lira was also helpful.
The Italian government plans to limit the
total budget deficit to 3 percent of GDP this
year; last year the ratio was almost 7.5 percent.
The intention is to achieve the reduction by in-
creases in sales taxes and by a surcharge on the
income tax (Euro tax). Furthermore, revenues
due in the following year should already be
paid in 1997. There are also several cuts on the
expenditure side. Furthermore, the marked fall
in interest rates implies a substantial reduction
of interest payments.
Nevertheless, the measures planned will
most likely not be sufficient to achieve the tar-
get of 3 percent. On the one hand, the increase
in nominal GDP will be lower than in the pro-
jection of the government. On the other hand,
the decision on the budget was made at a time
when the deficit for 1996 was expected to be
lower than it actually turned out. Therefore,
additional measures will have to be taken in a
supplementary budget. All this implies that the
stance of fiscal policy will be restrictive in
1997. Next year, however, there may be some
relief as there will be no further increases of
social contributions and the tax burden will fall
because the Euro tax will expire. Also, gov-
ernment expenditures will not be-cut by the
same amount as in previous years.
Since July 1996, the Banca d'ltalia has re-
duced key interest rates in three steps by two
and one-quarter percentage points; currently,
the discount rate stands at 6.75 %. Monetary
policy was loosened somewhat which also
shows up in an acceleration in the expansion of
monetary aggregates. While this already indi-
cates that monetary policy is becoming less re-
strictive, further cuts in interest rates are likely
in the near future because inflation has come
down considerably and the lira has regained
strength on currency markets. After a positive
decision on Italy's participation in EMU next
year, interest rates will be cut drastically to
levels prevailing in the countries with relatively
low rates. The impact of this expansionary
move on economic activity will, however,
mainly be felt in the later course of 1998 and
thereafter.
The recovery in Italy will, nevertheless,
make some progress already in 1997. Exports
will increase considerably because of the up-
swing mainly in the rest of Europe. While do-
mestic demand will remain weak for quite some
time, it will gain some strength next year when
economic policy will be no longer restrictive.
This will especially affect investment. Real
GDP will increase by about 1.5 percent this
year and by 3 percent in 1998. Inflation will not
go down much further but tend to stabilize on
the current level of about 2.5 percent. With pri-
vate consumption picking up next year, con-
sumer prices will probably rise a little faster.15
10. The Dublin Resolution — An Efficient Stability Pact?
In December 1996, the heads of state and of
government of EU countries decided upon an
outline for a "stability pact." The intention of
this pact is to assure fiscal discipline also for
the time after EMU will have started.
6 The re-
spective provisions of the Maastricht Treaty are
supplemented or made more precise. In par-
ticular, the following changes of the excessive
deficit procedure according to the Maastricht
Treaty are planned:
7
- While the Maastricht Treaty allows, in prin-
ciple, for sanctions, they are not qualified in
terms of their volume. The Dublin agreement
defines a deposit or a fine: It should consist
of a fixed component, which is equivalent to
0.2 percent of GDP, and a variable compo-
nent, which is equivalent to 10 percent of the
amount by which the deficit ratio exceeds
3 percent of GDP. The total amount should,
however, not be more than 0.5 percent of
GDP, so that a deficit ratio of more than
6 percent would not imply higher sanctions.
- It is defined under what circumstances a
deficit ratio of more than 3 percent should
not be qualified as excessive. Such excep-
tions will be made if real GDP declines by at
least 0.75 percent in a particular year.
8
- The time frame for the excessive deficit pro-
cedure was, in part, made more definite al-
though there seems to be a need for further
clarification. Our interpretation of the se-
quence of decisions is given in Table 5.
In our view, the agreement is not sufficient
to achieve the goal of fiscal discipline of EMU
members. One weakness is that, basically, the
procedure is still following Article 104c of the
Maastricht Treaty. The decision on whether an
excessive deficit exists will have to be made by
the governments who are themselves respon-
sible for those deficits. It will, therefore, be
difficult to find majorities for sanctions; and it
bears the risk that the procedure will be part of
the political process and that sanctions will be-
come a question of opportunistic behavior or of
negotiations rather than being imposed auto-
matically.
Furthermore, a lot of time can pass by until
sanctions are really decided upon. It may take
up to two and a half years until a (non-interest
bearing) deposit is to be paid. This long time
span results from the fact that many decisions
or reports by various institutions are necessary
in this procedure. Also, government may pre-
vent sanctions, or at least postpone their im-
position, by deciding upon measures to reduce
the budget deficit.
The sanctions lose their bite because of the
long time that is needed until they are adopted.
To be sure, 0.2 percent of GDP or more is a
sizable fee for an excessive budget. But a de-
posit is only due if the deficit exceeds 3 percent
for three years in a row, and the fine will only
be imposed after another two years with an ex-
cessive deficit. To avoid any sanctions at all,
i.e. paying a deposit or a fine, it is sufficient to
reduce the deficit below 3 percent once every
three years. If this is the case, the deposit will
be returned. If a fine is to be avoided, it is even
enough to have no excessive deficit once every
five years.
9
The stability pact in the current (preliminary)
version is, therefore, not an efficient instrument
for achieving fiscal discipline. The procedure
would have to be fundamentally changed. The
decisions on excessive deficits should not be in
the hands of the European Council. Since it is
difficult to set up a rule which would cover all
contingencies, i.e. a discretionary behavior can-
not be excluded, it would be best to establish an
independent institution. Furthermore, the pro-
cedure could be significantly shortened to al-
low for a more rapid imposition of sanctions;
for example, the time until decisions are due
could be reduced markedly. It is not necessary
to allow governments to prevent sanctions by
announcing measures to reduce the deficits; if
deficits are really pushed below the 3-percent
level, the deposit would be repaid anyway.
Finally, a sanction should be imposed for each
year with an excessive deficit.16
Table 5 — How Does the ..Stability Pact" Work? The Schedule of Decisions Following a Budget Deficit of More Than
3 Percent of GDP in 1999
March 2000:
Budget deficit for 1999 is published; it amounts to more than 3 p.c. of GDP. Procedure according to Article 104c of the
Maastricht Treaty is initiated.
Until summer 2000:




Investigation by the European Council:
Has the government under consideration taken appropriate




Deficit for 2001 is published. Investigation according
to Article 104c of the Maastricht Treaty.






deposit has to be paid.
March 2003:
Deficit for 2002 is published. Investigation according
to Article 104c of the Maastricht Treaty.





deposit has to be paid.
March 2002:
Deficit for 2001 is published. Investigation
according to Article 104c of the Maatricht








Deficit for 2002 is published. Investigation
according to Article 104c of the Maastricht
Treaty. Excessive budget deficit in 2002?
Yes
Deposit transformed into fine. Deposit repaid.
Procedure terminated.
March 2004:
Deficit for 2003 is published. Investigation according to Article 104c of the
Maastricht Treaty. Excessive budget deficit in 2003?
Yes
Deposit transformed into fine. Deposit repaid.
Procedure terminated.17



































































by 0.75 percent or more.
Such a rigid form of the sanction mechanism,
however, would probably not be accepted by
many governments. While it is explicitly stated
in the agreement that — under the assumption
of the promised balanced budget in the medium
term — fiscal policy would have enough room
for an active policy, many obviously fear that a
strict limit of 3 percent for the budget deficit
would undermine the effectiveness of auto-
matic stabilizers.
In order to analyze whether such fears are
founded, we look at the effects of the business
cycle on budget deficits. The cyclical compo-
nents measure the impact of the cyclical fluc-
tuation on revenues and expenditures.
1
0 Table
6 shows the maximum value of this component
in the EU countries (except Luxembourg) for
the period 1981-1996. At first, all years are
considered (column 1); in a second step, we
leave out those years in which real GDP de-
clined by at least 0.75 percent (column 2). This
differentiation, however, does not alter the re-
sults very much because a decline of this size
was rare during this period.
1
1
The observations reveal that — leaving aside
the exceptions according to the Dublin agree-
ment — there is only one country (Finland) in
which the cyclical deficit exceeded the
3 percent level in one year. Under the assump-
tion that business cycles will in the future not
be more pronounced than in the period after
1980 one can conclude that the efficacy of
automatic stabilization is not limited even un-
der a strict stability pact. A necessary condition
for not having an excessive deficit therefore is
that the structural deficits are substantially re-
duced; in the ideal case, they should be elimi-
nated completely. This may seem an ambitious
target because in 1996, structural deficits were
indeed still very high (column 3). But this tar-
get is explicitly stated in the Dublin agreement
where government commit themselves to a
balanced budget in the medium term.18
Endnotes
1 It is not quite certain whether Ireland is determined to join the EMU from the start.
2 Scheide and Solveen (1997) discuss two alternative conversion procedures: the central rates of the EMS and an average
of exchange rates over an extended period of, say, two years. Speculation against both rates cannot be profitable because
the exchange rates will not fall below the values at which they will be converted in the transition to EMU. Speculative
attacks are only likely if the rates of conversion are left open and market rates at the end of 1998 are taken as a reference.
3 A few central banks, especially the Deutsche Bundesbank, would probably like to raise interest rates considerably in
order to avoid a strong upswing and the ensueing risks for price level stability. However, we do not expect that these
more stability-oriented central banks will be able to pursue such a policy. The severe labor market problems will be a
factor that will lead to a strong opposition by other central banks and governments. It has to be remembered that during
this transition period there will be a kind of "institutional vacuum." There will not be an anchor currency as in the
present system of the EMS.
4 The countries appearing in Figure 2 are those European economies for which quarterly data on this aggregate are
available.
5 For a detailed a nalysis, cf. Boss et al. (1997).
" The agreements reached in Dublin so far are only intentions of the governments. The actual pact will have to be written
by the middle of June 1997. The final decision will then be made at the next European summit.
' The procedure is described in Article 104c of the Maastricht Treaty.
° A situation in which real GDP declines by more than 2 percent on a year will normally be called an exception. For a
decline between 0.75 and 2 percent, there is room for discretion. Furthermore, a unique event can also imply an
exception if it is not under the control of the country and has a dramatic impact on the deficit. A natural disaster or
unique events such as German unification would be obvious incidents.
" According to the schedule described in Table 5, the deficit in the year 2000 does not play a role. It can be assumed,
however, that a deficit below 3 percent of GDP in that year would also be sufficient to terminate the whole procedure.
1
0 We use the OECD estimates for the components (OECD 1996). The methods are described in Giorno et al. (1995).
1
1 In addition, it can be observed that the deficit did not reach its maximum in that year in which the largest decline of real
GDP occurred. This shows that the definition of a recession used in the stability pact is misleading because it is the
output gap rather than the annual change of GDP which is relevant for the deficit.19
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